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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only issue that was presented before the Industrial
Commission

and this Court

is whether

or not the Industrial

Commission correctly interpreted Rule 490-1-12(b) in determining
when interest was due and payable to Broadbent. There is no issue
of fact to be resolved by this Court because all facts are
undisputed.

Lastly, because the defendants made a few sporadic

payments of temporary total disability does not relieve them of
their obligation to pay interest on past due permanent partial
disability payments.

REPLY POINT I
The Industrial Commission's erroneous
interpretation of Rule 490-l-12(b) (Utah Admin.
Code 1991) is a question of law. There is no
question of fact in dispute.
A.

QUESTION OF LAW

Defendants claim that there is a question of fact
that still needs to be resolved. The facts are undisputed in this
case.

The only issue raised with the Industrial Commission and

with this Court concerns the interpretation of Rule 490-1-12(b) and
whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the proper date for the
interest to begin accrual.
Appendix A).

(R. 147 Industrial Commission Order,

Defendants are merely trying to "muddy the waters" by

claiming an issue of fact exists.

Defendants
interpretation was correct.

argue

that

the

Commission's

Notably absent from defendant's Brief

is any analysis of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78.

As noted in Mr.

Broadbent's Appellate Brief that section states:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable. (Emphasis
added)
Id.

Defendant's rely solely upon Rule 490-1-12(b).

Defendant's

claim that "Mr. Broadbent's condition was not fixed, according to
Dr. Bender, as of late 1990, so the award of interest from 1991
when his disability rating was confirmed by a medical panel, was in
accordance with R490-1-12B.2."

(Respondent's Brief p. 12). This

is an amazing claim given the fact that defendant's were willing to
pay Mr. Broadbent a settlement pursuant to Dr. Sorenson's 1987
impairment rating.

(R. 14)

In one breath defendants are claiming

that Broadbent was not stable and could not be paid PPD.

Then in

the next breath they claim that they made a settlement offer of
full value to Broadbent.

(Respondent's Brief P. 4, footnote 4 ) .

According to the defendant's, if Mr. Broadbent's condition had
continued to worsen for the rest of his life, but he continued to
work, they would never have had an obligation to pay permanent
partial disability let alone interest on that amount!
Furthermore, defendants do not address the Utah
Supreme Court case of Crenshaw v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
712 P.2d

247

(Utah 1985).

Defendants did not respond to this

because they had free use of Mr. Broadbent's money.
2

Clearly, this

is not what Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 had intended.

Nor did the Utah

Supreme Court intend such a situation to occur.

Dr. Bender's

report, that Mr. Broadbent had not yet stabilized as of 1990,
merely justifies Mr. Broadbent's refusal to accept defendant's
attempt to compromise this matter in 1987 for much less than he was
entitled.

The delay of payment is due to his medical condition.

That certainly is not any fault of his.

And as the Supreme Court

stated in Crenshaw:
Interest on each payment when due is not intended
as a penalty or punishment for the refusal to
pay. The interest is charged to the employer's
use of someone else's money.
The claimant is
unable to make any use of the money and the value
of the benefit is diminished when payment is
delayed. Any such delay in payment inevitably
results
in
the
claimant
subsidizing
the
employer's insurer. By Statute, interest must be
paid on each benefit payment which comprises an
award from the date the payment would have
otherwise been due and payable.
(Emphasis
added).
Id. at 250.
employer did.
payment

Mr. Broadbent did not have use of his money and the
The Supreme Court clearly stated: "Any such delay in

inevitably

employer's insurer."

results
Id.

in

the

claimant

subsidizing

the

Broadbent was not able to make use of

his money and defendant's insurance carrier was subsidized simply
because Mr. Broadbent was employed, not paid temporary

total

disability.
Because the Industrial Commission did not choose
which of Broadbent's impairment rating to accept until 1991, it
should not affect Broadbent's entitlement to interest when he had
returned to work in 1983 and had his temporary total disability
3

payments terminated.

Simply stated, defendants are trying to

penalize Mr. Broadbent for not being medically stable. Defendants
owed permanent partial disability payments to Broadbent the day the
temporary total disability payments ended and interest should begin
to accrue from that date on.
Lastly, because Broadbent provides this Court with
such a unique fact situation this Court can determine that the
administrative rule is in conflict with the statute and can be
disregarded by this Court.

It is undisputed that defendants had

terminated Broadbent's temporary total disability payments because
he had returned to work.
payable.

Broadbent's PPD payments were due and

Any other determination will simply allow insurance

companies to prolong the payment of permanent partial disability by
any means and have the use of an injured employee's benefits at no
charge.

Clearly, this is not what the statute nor the Supreme

Court intended happen.

Therefore, this Court can find that the

Rule is in conflict with the statute and disregard it and order
defendants to pay Broadbent interest on his past due permanent
partial disability payments.

B.

THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT

Defendants argue that because Mr. Broadbent has
multiple impairment ratings that his condition was not fixed and
this creates a question of fact. (Respondent's Brief p. 14-15).
This was never raised below and the Industrial Commission never
addressed this issue. Defendants now raise this issue and cite Dr.
4

Bender7s statement, "In review of these extensive medical records,
which cover the past eight years, it is apparent that Mr. Broadbent
has a progressive problem which is undoubtedly more impaired at
this time than several years ago." (R. 157) It is astounding that
defendants are now using Dr. Bender's medical report to try and
show that they are justified in not paying his benefits prior to
the medical panel's determination. When Broadbent relied upon Dr.
Bender's report in an attempt to settle this matter defendants
flatly refused.1

It is hard to believe that defendants truly

accept Dr. Bender's report, unless that statement can be twisted in
their favor.
In addition to the above, there is no question that
Broadbent's condition has progressively deteriorated due to the
Parkinson-like disease that has affected him since this accident.
Because that symptom was found not to be related to the industrial
accident no claim has been made on it. However, it is unclear from
Dr. Bender's report if he is claiming that the deterioration of
Broadbent's abilities was due to the Parkinson-like symptoms or his
total condition.

Dr. Bender included the Parkinson-like symptoms

in his total impairment rating.

Dr. Wirthlin clearly indicates

that the Parkinson-like symptoms have caused a lot of problems and
it has worsened since the accident.

Broadbent offered to settle for Dr Bender's twenty-four percent impairment ratmg plus interest, mileage, md the cost of Dr Bender's examination
Defendants try and make an issue of the fact that Mr Broadbent asked for interest, mileage, and the cost of Dr Bender's report (Respondent's Brief, p 5,
footnote 5 ) If defendant had truly believed Dr Bender's report, this case would have never gone to a medical panel It would have simply gone to a hearing
on the question of mtere.it, mileage, and the cost of Dr Bender's report

5

C.

OCCASIONAL PAYMENT8 OF TTD DOES NOT RELIEVE DEFENDANTS OF
THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO PAY INTEREST ON PAST DUE PPD.
Lastly, defendants make the absurd

claim that

because they made a payment of temporary total disability as late
as May 10, 19882 they are not required to pay interest on past due
permanent partial disability.

What defendants failed to clarify

for this court is that Broadbent was only paid temporary total
disability from August 14, 1986 through and including August 27,
1986, February 17, 1987 through and including March 8, 1987, and
apparently from March 14, 1988 through and including May 6, 1988.
This is a total of 12.57 weeks.

It was spread over three periods

of time, the first more than three years after Broadbent had
stopped receiving temporary total disability. Now they claim that
these occasional payments somehow magically relieves them of their
obligation to pay past due permanent partial disability.

This is

contrary to the statute, Supreme Court decisions, and Rule 490-112(b) . Clearly the intent of the statute and the Rule is that when
an injured employee is taken off temporary total disability,
permanent partial disability should begin from that date. If he is
still receiving permanent partial disability payments sometime
later and requires additional medical attention that causes him to
return to the temporary total disability then, obviously the

The document in the records (R. 89) indicates that Mr. Broadbent was paid temporary total disability until May 6, 1988. This document appears to be a
printout of a computer screen terminal produced on April 2, 1992. This document is difficult to interpret without some type of key for the symbols. Defendants
claim that May 10, 1988 was the date that Mr. Broadbent's temporary total disability payments ended. However, on the right hand side of the document it
appears that the temporary total disability payments where only paid until May 6, 1988. It is unclear as to what the numbers or the dates on the left hand side
represent. On the preceding page in the records (R. 88) the numbers on the left hand side do not correspond at all with the dates that the temporary total
disability was paid in the columns on the right. Nevertheless, defendants merely paid Mr. Broadbent temporary total disability for eighty-eight (88) days or 12.57
weeks from the time that he was released to return to work on June 9, 1983 through and including approximately August 17, 1992 when defendants tendered
the amount ordered by the Industrial Commission.

6

permanent partial disability payments would be suspended. However,
when an injured employee, such as Broadbent, is injured, becomes
stable, and has further medical attention, much later, requires
brief payments of additional temporary total disability does not
nullify

the

obligation

to

pay

the

prior

permanent

partial

disability payments. Defendants claim that interest doesn't accrue
until after the last temporary total disability payment is simply
unfounded.

CONCLUSION
The only issue before this court is whether or not
the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted Rule 490-1-12(b).
That is a question of law. Because Broadbent was cleared to return
on June 10, 1983, his temporary total disability payments ended on
that date. Consequently, his permanent partial disability payments
became due at that time, as well.
numerous

impairment

ratings

simply

Mr. Broadbent has received
because

the doctors have

disagreed concerning his medical condition.

Nevertheless, an

impairment rating was first given on September 5, 1984.

If a

doctor can give an impairment rating, whether it is correct or not,
Broadbent's impairment could be determined on that date.
Defendants then used Dr. Bender's statement that
Broadbent was more impaired at the time of that examination than he
was several years ago to justify their nonpayment of interest.
This is a remarkable position to take, since defendants flatly
refused to accept Dr. Bender's report prior.

7

Furthermore, it is

unclear as to whether Dr. Bender is referring to the deterioration
of Broadbent's condition as being caused by the industrial related
injury or the Parkinson-like symptoms Broadbent has. Consequently,
defendants claim of a question of fact is simply unfounded.
Because defendants have had the use of Broadbent's
money for a significant amount of time, this court must order that
they pay interest from that amount.

Broadbent was taken off

temporary total disability on June 10, 1983, consequently his
permanent partial disability payments should begin on that date.
In the alternative, he received his first impairment rating on
April 23, 1984. Clearly, his medical condition could be determined
at that date.

Therefore, Defendant should be ordered to pay

interest from that date.
DATED this 24th day of November, 1992.

ROBERT B 7 S « E 5 ^
\*S
Attorneys for i^ppellants

Ey#ENE C. MILLER', JR.
Attorneys for Appellants
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APPENDIX A
ORDER

JUN 0 1 1992
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Fred Broadbent,
Applicant,

*

vs.
Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial Indemnity,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*

DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW
IN PART
Case No. 90000918

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and
Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial
Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed.
The above named respondents submitted their response to
applicant's first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to
respondent's Motion for Review. Respondents provided a further
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6,
1992.
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be
considered untimely.
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we
will consider the responses.
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total
disability benefits (TTD).
The respondents claim that the
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD

FRED BROADBENT
ORDER
PAGE TWO
rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1937.
an application for hearing in October 1990.

The applicant filed

In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the
statute.
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded
the applicant a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the
medical panel impairment rating of 23 percent, and ordered that the
applicant's compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of
eight percent from December 23, 1991.
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the
proper date for the interest to begin accrual.
The applicant
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated.
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment
rating of 2 0 percent.
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the
award of interest on workers compensation benefits:
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker
disability is legislation for the public welfare. It is also clear that the statute providing for interest on unpaid benefits was a
legislative attempt to remedy a sericus social
problem: the depreciation of the value of benefits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a
final determination of eligibility and an award

FRED BROADBENT
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was made.
Marshall v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985),
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
1953 as amended 1981.
Further, our rules state that:
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits
shall become "due and payable11 (as used in Section
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows:
* * *

2.

Permanent partial compensation shall be
due and payable on the next day following the termination of a temporary total
disability. However, where the condition
is not fixed for rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the
permanent partial impairment can be medically determined.

Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991).
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled
to such payments.
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ.
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his
travel.
The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the
respondents' reply to applicant's motion argues that the Order did
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant

FRED BROADBENT
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has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our
decision.
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16,
192 provides that:
An employee who, based upon his/her physician's advice, requires hospital, medical,
surgical, or consultant services for injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment and who is authorized by the
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial
Commission to obtain such services from a
physician and or hospital shall be entitled
to [certain reimbursements].
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992).
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code
1992) .
Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized
care.
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application
before the effective date of the new rule.
Therefore, the
requirement that the applicant submit his reiquests for travel
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992.
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However,
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of
treatment and return.
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee

FRED BROADBENT
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the
reimbursement.
Preferably this should be discussed, among such
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over
mileage as presented in this case.
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case.
The
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ.
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of
this issue.
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we
will approve the amounts claimed.
The remaining issue to be discussed,
issue raised by the respondents in their
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah
Act prohibits the Commission from making an
of permanent partial disability after eight
applicant's injury.

and which is the only
Motion for Review is
Workers' Compensation
award to the applicant
years from the date of

The statute in question reads:
The Commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting
from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of the injury and who files an application for such
purpose prior to the expiration of such
eight-year period.
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981).
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument,
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking
Commission's award was caused by the applicant.

the
the
the
the

The use of the word "may" clearly shows that the Commission is
not required to make such award within the €iight year period,
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to
those situations where the applicant's condition has not
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be
provided until stabilization.
Under these circumstances, such
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration
of the eight year period.
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application
before the eight year period.
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision.
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to
uphold the findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are
appropriate under the circumstances.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this ^ 9 ^ day of
ATTEST:
Patricia O. ^sn^y
Commission Secretary

}T)^
L-j~

1992.
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